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ENALUATING TECHNOLOGICAL RISK: 
PRESCRIPTIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE PERSPECTIVES 
John W .  Lathrop 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Decisions concerning the deployment and management of novel or 
hazardous technologies raise several issues involving the evaluation of 
their impacts on society. Examples of such decisions include the siting of 
a liquefied natural gas facility, the regulation of nuclear energy produc- 
tion, and the screening and regulation of toxic chemicals. Each of these 
kinds of decisions results in uncertain benefits and costs to society. I t  
would seem reasonable, then, that  such decisions could be aided by any 
of several analytic techniques, including cost-benefit analysis, or perhaps 
decision analysis, which could include in the evaluation attitudes toward 
uncertainty and value tradeoffs between conflicting objectives. However, 
there are often special aspects involved in such decisions which can make 
standard technical or economic analyses not very useful for aiding politi- 
cal decision-making processes. These aspects include outcomes of the 
decision having very serious negative consequences with very low proba- 
bility, inequitable distribution of burden, large scale, novelty and others 
to be discussed below. Decisions involving such aspects sometimes come 
to be known as  problems in managing social risk. Even though the word 
risk is currently in wide use in the media, it  is often defined or used in 
different ways by different parties to the decision a t  hand. In spite of this 
serious problem, to be discussed a t  some length below, the need to 
appraise the risks presented by a new or hazardous technology has led to 
the development of several analytic techmques often referred to collec- 
tively as risk assessment. Yet those techmques generally assume, either 
implicitly or explicitly, certain prescriptive objective functions that are  
not sensitive to important societal concerns about potentially hazardous 
technologies. As a result, such techniques may be useful as inputs to a 
political decision making process, but are not as helpful as they could be 
if they used objective'functions more descriptive of the relevant social 
concerns. This point is illustrated by cases where a member of the techn- 
ical risk assessment community assumes a simple objective function, 
such as minimizing expected lives lost or life expectancy lost, observes 
individual or government behavior that  does not minimize that objective 
function, then suggests that therefore something is wrong with the deci- 
sion makers involved (see e.g., Rothschild 1979). That deduction is not 
the only one that could be made from the evidence. It could equally well 
be deduced that  the objective function is inadequate. 
The technical risk assessment community is not the only set of peo- 
ple addressing problems of social risk management. There is a g r o w q  
body of research that  is developing descriptions and explanations of 
human behavior that does not minimize narrow technical objective func- 
tions (Kunreuther, 1980). Yet the descriptions and explanations most 
sensitive to individual attitudes are not oriented toward developing 
broader social objective functions that can be directly used to  aid the pol- 
itical decision making process in managmg social risk. The development 
of evaluation models and t e c h q u e s  by the  technical and psychological 
research communities forms a rough spectrum from the narrow but 
readily applied technical objective function to the broad set of social and 
psychological considerations that are not readily applied to aiding the 
decision process. This paper seeks to identify the part  of that spectrum 
that ,  if further developed, may be the most useful in that  it may provide 
usable decision aids that are  also sensitive to  the important societal con- 
cerns involved. 
11. THE BASIS OF THE PROBLEM: TWO PERSPECTIYES OF RISK 
Whde the previous section referred to  the range of approaches to 
risk evaluation as a spectrum, it has underlying it two poles of thought 
whch  underly the theme of thls paper: The basis of the problem of 
managing technological risk is that it is not a single concept, but is 
viewed from two distinct perspectives, the technical and the psychologi- 
cal. 
A. Technical Perspective 
From the technical perspective, technological risk is some probabil- 
ity distribution over sets of negative effects. Those effects are often lim- 
ited to health effects, or casualties. For example, Keeney (1980b) defines 
the risk of an action as the probability distribution over sets of individual 
probabilities of dying, {pi , i= l  . . N j ,  where pi is the probability that 
the i t h  individual will die before the end of the next time period due to 
the action taken. The, probability distribution over those sets is required 
to represent dependencies between the fatalities. Other analysts use 
summary measures of that distribution. In the Rasmussen report (Reac- 
tor Safety Study) the risk of a nuclear reactor is represented by a 
reverse cumulative probability distribution over numbers of fatalities per 
year per reference reactor (USNRC 1975). That distribution is sometimes 
referred to as a Rasmussen curve. Other risk assessments have used the 
same measure (Hazelwood and Philipson 1977). Other analysts go one 
step further and reduce the distribution to the expected number of 
health effects (e.g., Pate 1978). While it would be perhaps unfair to say 
that such analysts define risk as expected number of health effects, the 
fact remains that the negative consequences of a technological option are 
measured by that index. 
There is one definition of risk not discussed here, and that is : "risk 
is probability times consequence". This is because this discussion is lim- 
ited to representations of the risk of decision alternatives. Probability 
times consequence may describe the risk of an event, but could not in 
general describe the risk of any decision alternative with more than two 
possible outcomes 
B. Psychological Perspective 
In contrast to the fairly straightforward risk definitions listed above, 
extensive psychological research in the field of risk perception has sug- 
gested many more dimensions to be included in a definition of risk (Slovic 
e t  al. 1980, Linnerooth 1978, Kunreuther 1980). Whle these dimensions 
are covered .in some detail in a later section, they are listed and briefly 
discussed here as a way of describing technological risk from a psycho- 
logical perspective. They are listed roughly in order from the most easily 
adapted to a simple technical measure to the most difficult considera- 
tions to measure. Whle t h s  discussion limits itself to health effects for 
brevity, there is no particular reason not to 'include bther effects: finan- 
cial, quality of environment, etc. 
1. Ezpected  n u m b e r  of hea l th  e f fec t s  
While t h s  aspect was listed above as part of the technical perspec- 
tive, that  does not mean that it cannot be a part of a psychological per- 
spective also. 
2. P o s s i b i l i f y  of c a t c ~ s t r o p h e  
Effects can be spread out over time and space, such as car fatalities. 
or they can be "bunched" into a catastrophe a t  one place and time, such 
as a possible major nuclear accident. That bunching can be very impor- 
tant  for how society views the risk. Effects can also be bunched by cause, 
by identifiable population group, or by state of nature, as will be 
explained later. 
3. E q u i t y  
There are actually two related aspects of equity that  are important 
to perception of risk. The first is the amount of overlap between the popu- 
lations a t  risk and a t  benefit. Clearly if a technology benefits none of 
those a t  risk, that  is a case of inequity. But there is another, more sub- 
tle aspect of inequity that  has to do with the ease of identifying the popu- 
lation a t  risk. If a technology can be identified as negatively affecting 100 
people in the U.S . ,  whle benefiting all citizens, that  may be seen as a 
necessary evil. But what if those 100 are all poor, or all asbestos work- 
ers? That is a matter  of greater concern. 
4 .  Degree of contro l  
Ths  aspect is a more general version of the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction made by Starr  (1969). The central concept here is the  level of 
participation of each potential impactee in each of two decisions: to 
expose himself to  the risk, and to  deploy the technology in the first place. 
5. At t r ibu tab i l i t y  
This is an important aspect of social reaction to a risk that  is often 
overlooked because of the cause-specific way risk analyses are done. It 
could be that  generally incompetent engineering in cars kills far more 
people that  a particular gas tank design. Yet the more easily identified 
cause of accidents, the gas tank, may give rise to  a much stronger public 
reaction. 
6. Non- probabil is t ic  fac tors  
Perhaps the most serious mismatch between technical and psycho- 
logical perspectives lies in the evaluation of risk related to  severe out- 
comes with no regard for the estimated probability of those outcomes. 
While there may be good reasons for that  sort of evaluation, it can cause 
serious problems in developing consistent decision aids. 
7. Non- decis ion  compar i sons  
The search for criteria for acceptable risk often falls back on com- 
parisons not involved in actual decisions. For example, comparisons are 
often made between some technological risk and moving to Denver, or 
smoking an extra cigarette, or driving an extra mile. Yet very few people 
choose between living near a nuclear reactor or living in Denver. Perhaps 
even fewer choose between living near a liquefied natural gas terminal 
and smoking an extra cigarette, though that  decision involves some com- 
plicating factors. 
8. Non- technological factors 
Some aspects of a technology having little to do with possible health 
effects may have a great deal to do with perceived risk. Those aspects 
include the degree of centralization, the extent to which deploying a tech- 
nology would infringe on civil liberties, how closely a new technology is 
linked with a high-consumption lifestyle, etc. While these aspects seem 
far removed from evaluating the health effect risk of a technology, they 
should be included in any effort to understand possible opposition to a 
technology. Such aspects may be as important or more so than any of 
the other aspects listed above in determining differences in what levels of 
risk are held to be acceptable. 
C. Results of the Two Perspectives 
The differences between the two perspectives presented above are  
very relevant to many problems in technological risk management. Tech- 
nological risks are typically evaluated using analyses that  assume the 
technical perspective on risk. Yet very often the political process in 
which the decisions actually get  made is responsive to the psychological 
perspective. As an example of t h s  problem, consider the case of the 
selection of a site for a liquefied natural gas import terminal in California. 
A technical risk analysis by a competent technical consulting firm found a 
proposed site a t  Oxnard, California, to be very safe, with very low risk to  
the community. Yet that  analysis stated that a maximum credible 
accident (MCA) could involve up to 70,000 fatalities, though only by a 
seemingly incredible series of events that  could only occur with an  
extremely low probability. In the political process, however, considera- 
tion of such large numbers of fatalities led to a requirement that the ter- 
minal be sited remotely, away from any city, precluding the Oxnard site 
(Ahern, 1980). The applicant made plans according to a technical risk 
analysis, then had to change plans as a result of the political process. 
As the example just presented illustrates, one result of the gap 
between the technical and psychological perspectives of risk is that 
technical risk analyses are often not effective in the political process. 
Conversely, another result is that the political process often does not 
receive the help it could from the scientific and engineering community. 
Another result of the two perspectives on risk is that the community 
of risk analysis scientists and engineers work with analysis tools spanning 
a broad spectrum. One end of that spectrum involves prescriptive evalua- 
tion models that offer very clear guidance t o  decision makers, but that 
are not sensitive to psychological concerns. The other end of the spec- 
trum involves psychologists and other social scientists identifying societal 
concerns very well, but not in a manner that results in clear guidance to 
the decision making process. Clearly, what is called for is more develop- 
ment of risk evaluation models that are sensitive to social and psychologi- 
cal concerns, yet are meaningful and useful aids to the political decision- 
making process. Section IV below spells out several considerations for 
that model development. Before that, however, the next chapter briefly 
reviews two existing approaches to risk evaluation that bracket the part 
of the analysis spectrum proposed for development in Chapter IV. 
III. TWO APPROACHES TO RISK WALUATJON 
A. Multiattribute Utility Functions 
Withn the framework of decision analysis, multiattribute utility 
theory can be used to develop essentially prescriptive risk evaluation 
models that take into account more than the expected number of health 
effects. As one example, Ralph Keeney (1980b) sets up a notation where 
" r i sk  ez ante is represented as a probability distribution over sets of pro- 
babilities, fpi { ,  where each pi is the probability that the i th  individual will 
die due to the action being evaluated before the end of some time period. 
He represents "risk" ez post as a set  of status indicators f zi j ,  where 
xi = 1 if the i th  individual has died due to  the evaluated action in the time 
period, and zi = 0 otherwise. He goes on to postulate von Neumann Mor- 
genstern utility functions UR on bij, UF on f zi j and u on 2, where 
z = zz , ,  the total number of fatalities. He defines a desire for equity as 
a 
a preference for more equal pi 's, sets up a consistency condition between 
UR and UF, and shows that these conditions lead in his notation to a risk 
evaluation function as simply u(x) and even shows that it must be convex 
downward, representing preferences that would prefer a technology 
characterized by a low-probability-high-loss over one with high- 
probability-low-loss and the same expected loss. This seems at odds with 
the general aversion to catastrophe that seems to be found in some pub- 
lic attitudes toward risk. Keeney goes on to  add another condition that is 
consistent with a slightly more complex functional form. While Keeney's 
evaluation functions incorporate a particular form of equity preference 
and a n  attitude toward uncertainty, the form of the evaluation model fol- 
lows from more of a prescriptive than descriptive set of assumptions. 
Sam Bodily (1980) develops another sort of utility function that 
accounts for several more descriptive aspects than does Keeney's 
models. Bodily's model accounts for the number of people sharing the 
risk, number of casualties per incident, the initial and final states of 
health involved, changes in individual probabilities of harm or benefit, 
how voluntary the risk is, and whether lives are  being saved or lost. In a 
se t  of different examples of risk management alternatives, h s  calcula- 
tions show the effective value of life varying by 170% due to differences in 
factors just listed. The key to  Bodlly's model is the combination of 
summed willingness to pay to avoid individual risk and a utility measure 
of attitude toward group risks in a single measure of social risk. While 
Bodily's model captures an admirable number of factors, it does not 
involve some other factors that are important, especially equity con- 
siderations. That is more or less an artifact of h s  particular presenta- 
tion, however. The model framework Bodily proposes could be extended 
to include other factors of risk. 
The evaluation models proposed by Bodily and Keeney represent 
promising attempts to model preferences concerning social risk that  are 
not simply linear in numbers of health effects. Their models are basically 
applications of multiattribute utility theory, with the value elicitation 
questions effectively designed by the model. That is, the model is 
developed, with some consideration for what is important, then the elici- 
tation questions are derived by what is necessary to derive the values of 
the parameters used in the model. Tlus process leads to elicitation 
questions that are  very relevant to the issues involved, but that are quite 
unusual and do not occur to people in their normal experience. 
Approaches for improving this situation are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
B. Psychological Considerations 
Research on risk evaluation does not always entail a quantitative 
model that  yields a scalar index of risk. In t h s  section we will discuss 
psychological research that  simply identifies and lists the considerations 
to be kept in mind in evaluating risk. The research selected as a n  exam- 
ple is the work of Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein 
(Slovic e t  al. 1980, 1981; Fischhoff et al. 1978, 1980; Lichtenstein e t  al. 
1978). They draw on a large body of experimental work of their own and 
others to enumerate the ways in wbch people are  bad a t  probabilistic 
thinking, including the several biases and heuristics people have been 
found to  use in choosing among alternatives with uncertain outcomes. 
They then develop implications of those biases and heuristics for prob- 
lems in managing social risk. As they have done much of their work in 
problems with acceptance of nuclear power, they list the qualitative 
aspects of that  technology that help to explain the lack of acceptance, as 
derived from experimental work. Those aspects include lack of control 
over the technology, dread, lethality of effects, potential for catastrophe, 
potential for unknown effects, and novelty of the technology. Each of 
these aspects is defined more precisely in their papers. It should be 
clear from this list that  the work of Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein was 
a primary source for the list of aspects of the  psychological perspective 
on risk presented in this paper. They go on to list problems in evaluating 
social risk and recommendations for paths to acceptance of technological 
risk. They do a remarkable job of listing considerations to be kept in 
mind in evaluating and managing social risk, but do not develop any equa- 
tions for an evaluation index for risk. In the most broad sense, i t  could be 
maintained that they do present a model of social preference concerning 
risk, in that  their lists of biases and considerations explain observed 
phenomena of societal acceptance and rejection of certain risks. I t  could 
also be maintained that their work results in decision aids, in that  they 
list recommendations for decision makers involved in managing social 
risk. However, they do not develop an evaluation model, if such a model 
is defined in the narrow sense as a set of equations resulting in a single 
evaluation index. 
C. Limitations of the Approaches 
The multiattribute utility approach does not provide the actual util- 
ity function to be used, but only the parameterized form of the function 
along with a protocol of questions to ask somebody whose answers can be 
used to calculate those parameter values. In other words, the utility 
function approach does not actually provide any answers, but only 
rephrases the questions into simpler, more understandable forms that 
are nevertheless just as difficult to answer. But this approach has even 
greater difficulties in tha t .  there is seldom such a consensus on value 
tradeoffs that it does not matter from whom you elicit the values. That 
gives rise to a whole host of problems concerning whose values to elicit 
and how to aggregate different values into a single risk evaluation model 
(see Arrow 1977 for a review of social choice theory). The second 
approach discussed, labeled psychological considerations, is the most 
sensitive to the social value aspects of risk evaluation. However, because 
it does not provide a risk evaluation index, it is not directly useful as a 
decision aid. 
There are two limitations shared by both of the approaches dis- 
cussed. The first of these is that equity considerations may simply not be 
appropriately incorporated into any evaluation approach. Such aspects 
may only be approachable withn the bargaining procedure of the political 
decision making process. An evaluation approach may hope to aid one or 
more parties in that  bargaining, but any attempts to  replace that  bar- 
gaining with a model could be considered inappropriate. 
The second shared limitation is perhaps the most serious. That is 
that the institutional structures making the risk management decision 
may not be compatible with the decision structure assumed by the  
evaluation approach. For example, the most basic assumption made by 
the utility approach is that  there is some single self-aware process some- 
where where the risks and benefits of the actual decision alternatives are  
compared. In fact, i t  is often the case that a regulatory agency, such as 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),  is faced with what appear to 
be "yes/noU decisions on a single alternative that involves social risk. Of 
course, the NRC is actually participating in an unorganized way with 
several other government agencies and private companies in a set of 
actions whch results in a selection of one of the risky alternatives. But 
where in that set of actions is the single self-aware process that  weighs 
the risks and benefits of the different alternatives? Whose value 
assumptions and tradeoffs should be used in the risk evaluation? Where 
should the results of the risk evaluation be delivered? It is entirely possi- 
ble that  the biggest limitation in the usefulness of a risk evaluation is the 
decision making process it is intended to serve (Kunreuther 1980). It 
could be that  any improvement to be made in risk evaluation models 
would not be as important as it would be to organize the decision making 
process so that the risks of the actual decision alternatives are compared 
directly. That type of organization will be referred to  in t b s  paper as 
decision-focused. Yet a development of a risk evaluation model that is 
demonstrably sensitive to the aspects of risk management decisions that  
the political process is sensitive to could go a long way toward encourag- 
ing the political process to adopt that desirable decision-focused organi- 
zation. The development of a risk evaluation model that  could achieve 
that  end would be an ambitious undertaking. The next section explores 
the initial considerations to be kept in mind as one embarks on such an 
adventure. 
IV. T0WARDAMORE:BROADAPPROACH 
A General Perspective 
The previous sections have discussed research resulting in catalogs 
of social and psychological considerations, and contrasted that with mul- 
tiattribute utility risk evaluation models, whch  provide a risk evaluation 
index. The previous sections have also explained the need for a risk 
evaluation model that  lies between the index-producing models and the 
catalog approach. Such a model would provide a risk evaluation index, 
and so be more directly useful a decision aid than the catalog approach, 
yet it would also be more sensitive t o  societal concerns regarding risk 
than the index-producing models reviewed above. This section will outline 
the fundamental considerations necessary to the development of such a 
model. 
The discussion in this section will be based upon two major themes. 
The first is that  a risk evaluation model should not be limited to providing 
only one of many inputs into a decision making process, but should be a 
direct aid to that  process. That is, the model should not leave entirely to 
the decision makers the difficult job of putting together a large set of 
seemingly incommensurate pieces of data. Rather, i t  should deliver 
results in a form that  aids the members of the process to integrate those 
results with the other considerations that enter in. The model should be 
designed to elevate the level of debate by providing a structured frame- 
work of reasoned evaluation withn whch the decision can be made. 
The second theme whch  forms the basis of the following discussion is 
that  the risk evaluation model should be built around risk considerations 
that  drive the political decision making process. The order of develop- 
ment of the model should be from the primary concerns of the process to  
the value elicitations that  would capture those concerns to the form of 
the model that  would be logically fit to  those elicitations. T h s  is a subtle 
theme, at  best,  and one not incompatible with the models of Keeney and 
Bodily. The basic idea is to start  from the observables that  people react 
to in a risk management problem, and build the model around those. 
B. General Methodology 
The general methodology adopted here is based on multiattribute 
utility theory. That discipline is only briefly described here. The reader 
is referred to a basic text for a complete description (e.g., Keeney and 
Raiffa 1976). The methodology is based on the fitting of a multiattribute 
utility function (i.e., a multi-argument von Neumann Morgenstern utility 
function), to the answers a person gives to a structured set  of questions. 
The basic aspects of preference captured by the function are tradeoffs 
between conflicting objectives (i.e., slopes of indifference curves) and 
attitudes toward uncertainty. The key development of the methodology is 
a set of theorems relating various plausible and testable assumptions 
about preferences to  corresponding simple forms of multiattribute utility 
functions (MAUF). The fitting of the MAUF in a value elicitation interview 
then amounts to a set of assumption tests to identify the most simple 
acceptable form of the function, followed by the set of judgments neces- 
sary to fit the parameters of that functional form. Those judgments 
include indifference map comparisons and preference comparisons of 
simple uncertain alternatives. The fundamental concept underlying the 
methodology is that individuals are not good a t  choices between complex 
alternatives (such as actions involving multidimensional and uncertain 
outcomes), but can make choices between simple alternatives in a 
manner consistent with their underlying preferences. The methodology 
provides a mathematical system which can take alternatives too complex 
for consistent intuitive judgment, and evaluate them in a manner con- 
sistent with a person's judgments concerning simple alternatives, where 
his judgments are more apt to accurately reflect his underlying prefer- 
ences. 
In typical expositions of the decision analysis methodology, the first 
steps in building the evaluation function are to identify the objectives of 
the decision maker, and describe an observable measure for each objec- 
tive that  represents the degree to whch each alternative satisfies that  
objective. This section identifies typical objectives of the decision making 
process concerned with social risk.management, taking the psychological 
perspective of risk described earlier. Each objective is identified and 
characterized in a way that  suggests possible observable measures that  
could be used to develop the evaluation function itself and its correspond- 
ing elicitation procedure. As t h s  section represents only a first effort a t  
the development of a comprehensive risk evaluation model, those further 
steps in model development are left to future research. 
C. Objectives of Risk Management from a Psychological Perspective 
In the objectives listed below, it is assumed that  some single- 
dimensional measure of social cost has been decided upon that evaluates 
all the health and environmental effects upon an individual in some stan- 
dard unit. There is no intention to suggest that such a measure would be 
easily derived, a s  it would require answers to such questions as: How 
many colds is a cancer worth? However, as the objectives listed involve 
considerations above and beyond the measure of the severity of a 
deleterious effect upon an  individual, it clarifies the discussion consider- 
ably to  assume such a measure exists. 
As a second concession to clarity, the following discussions focus on 
the evaluation model itself, and so do not consider such frequently dom- 
inant problems as disagreements on the probabilities to  be used in calcu- 
lating the evaluation measure. 
1. Ezpected number of health effects 
Whle the expected number of health effects is a common measure of 
risk from a technological perspective, it can also be considered relevant 
to the psychological perspective. I t  is most relevant when the health 
effects are lives lost or  saved, and expected lives lost or saved are con- 
sidered equivalent to actual lives lost or saved. In that sense the 
expected fatalities measure has an ethical basis that  leads to a troubling 
dilemma concerning the addition of other objectives to an evaluation 
function. A risk management strategy using simply expected fatalities as 
an evaluation function will, if successful, minimize expected lives lost. 
Any strategy using a more comprehensive evaluation function will allow 
more expected lives lost in any nondegenerate case. Thus that  
comprehensiveness in evaluation has "cost" some increment in expected 
lives lost (or decrement in expected lives saved). Whle that  increment 
would not actually be a cost in terms of the social welfare represented by 
the evaluation function, it would nevertheless be the case that  any 
at tempt to use a more comprehensive evaluation model would be open to 
the attack that its use would cost human lives, expectationally. 
Tlus first objective is exceptional in that the measure of the objective 
to be used in the evaluation model is the objective itself. The major 
measurement problems involved in this objective are hidden in the clari- 
fying conventions presented at  the beginning of thls subsection (W.C.). 
The remaining objectives listed below do not have such obvious measures 
associated with them. 
2. Possibility of  catastrophe 
While the idea of possibility of catastrophe may be intuitively clear, 
closer examination reveals a complex concept. As has often been men- 
tioned in comparisons of coal and nuclear power as sources of electricity, 
whle expected fatalities per megawatt-year (electric) may be estimated 
as less for nuclear than for coal, the fact that the nuclear fatalities occur 
in high-fatality, low-probability accidents explains public resistance to 
nuclear power (Barrager e t  al. 1976). This comparison will be mentioned 
again below, since in fact there are a number of reasons that  could 
explain that resistance aside from the possibility of catastrophe. How- 
ever, for this discussion the example is useful in considering just what 
catastrophe means. It seems clear that a catastrophe is a "bunchng" 
together of fatalities, but on what dimension does that bunching occur? 
Fatalities can be bunched together in one place, or  a t  one time, or  in one 
state of nature, or by one identified cause, or in one previously identifi- 
able group of people. These various types of bunchng may correspond to  
different types of preference mechanisms. 
The risk of a nuclear reactor involves bunching on all five of the 
dimensions just listed: fatalities are concentrated in states of nature that  
correspond to an accident, are grouped downwind of the facility a t  the 
time of the accident, are bunched by single cause, and impact the neigh- 
bors of the reactor. A coal plant induces fatalities that occur with some 
degree of certainty and so are distributed over many states of nature, 
and are  distributed in space, time, and groups of people. Coal plant fatal- 
ities are  not even bunched by identifiable cause, in tha t  respiratory ail- 
ments caused by the coal plant cannot be distinguished from ailments 
with other causes. Bunchng is not always so highly correlated across 
causes. For example, fatalities due to nuclear waste may be bunched by 
state of nature (failure of casings, misunderstanding of physical 
processes), and bunched by location, but not bunched by identifiable 
cause, and distributed over very long periods of time and groups of peo- 
ple (generations). Risk due to train derailments of toxic chemicals may 
be concentrated in the poor segments of the population who live near 
railroad tracks, though it is distributed over several accidents (in dif- 
ferent states of nature, places, tlmes) each with very few fatalities. 
Bunching by identifiable cause is evaluated in the attributability 
objective discussed later.  Bunching by identifiable group is evaluated as 
par t  of the concept of equity also discussed below. That leaves catas- 
trophe defined here as  a bunchng in space, time, or state of nature. 
Another way of defining a catastrophe is as  a number of fatalities linked 
in any way. By either definition, the problem remains to evaluate atti- 
tude toward catastrophe. The measure could be  a set  of probability dis- 
tributions over numbers of health effects in each different type of catas- 
trophe, if more than one type is possible. 
Efforts thus far in the evaluation of potential for catastrophe have 
taken three paths. First, a nonlinear value function over number of fatali- 
ties has been suggested, either as an ad hoc function or as a von Neu- 
mann Morgenstern utility function (Keeney 1980a). In the cited reference 
Keeney speculates that such a curve would be convex downward due to 
riskless preference effects (diminishng marginal disutility for health 
effects). That convexity represents a preference for bunched over distri- 
buted fatalities. Second, a multiattribute utility function has been sug- 
gested, where the health status of each person is an attribute (Bodily 
1980). With such a function, the interaction terms represent attitudes 
toward catastrophe. With both of these evaluation strategies, if only the 
suggested utility function is used the evaluation is only sensitive to 
bunching in states of nature, and does not account for differences in 
bunchng in space and time. Neither model has the required argument 
structure or elicitation protocol to  be sensitive to  bunching in space and 
time that  is not bunched by state of nature. While the required extension 
of the model's notation would be relatively straightforward, attempts to 
extend the elicitation protocols as necessary reveal some fundamental 
problems to be discussed in a subsequent paper. 
3. Equity 
Just as discussions concerning risk often suffer from lack of a defini- 
tion of risk, discussions concerning equity may involve as many as three 
distinctly different concepts going by the same name. Each concept is 
discussed in turn here. 
a) Correspondence be tween  populations a t  risk a n d  a t  benef i t .  
Strip mining may involve risk externalities imposed on people of the 
mining region so that people in a distant metropolis can run air condi- 
tioners. This form of the equity problem has been addressed at great 
length in the social choice literature, and so will not be discussed at any 
depth here. It should be noted, however, that no consensus exists as to 
the best method for evaluating a situation that is inequitable in this sense 
(Arrow 1977). After risk evaluations for each of the populations whose 
members .are roughly equally affected, the use of those measures in a 
decision may be one aspect of risk evaluation best left to  the political 
process. 
b) Ease of iden t i f y ing  people a t  risk: s i z e  of ind iv idua l  probabil i-  
t ies.  
WMe the size of an individual's probability for a health effect is of 
interest for willingness-to-pay calculations, in this discussion that number 
is used to represent a &fferent concern: how much society knows about 
who and how many will be victims. Suppose a technology is estimated to 
cause one expected fatality (EF). The size of the population bearing that 
risk would be of great importance to its evaluation. Consider that 1 EF 
risk to one person is very different from 1 EF risk equally shared by 100 
- people, or 1 EF risk equally shared by lo8 people. The difference to 
society between these cases is in its level of knowledge as to w h o  and how 
m a n y  may die. At a fixed number of expected fatalities, the variance 
over numbers of fatalities rises with the number of people equally sharing 
the risk, though only very sllghtly once there are more than 20 people. 
While this sensitivity to the size of the group sharing one EF of risk could 
be confounded with sensitivity toward attributability, discussed below, it 
could not be confounded with sensitivity toward catastrophe, as there is 
no consideration for intercorrelation of the occurrence of the fatalities. 
The relationship between ddferences in individual probabilities and 
variance in number of fatalities is that for a given level of expected fatali- 
ties, the less different the individual probabilities, the greater the vari- 
ance in number of fatalities. This relationship is interesting in that it 
explains a problem presented by Keeney in his 19BOb paper. Keeney 
establishes an evaluation of numbers of fatalities by a von Neumann Mor- 
genstern utility function over that number. He points out that an aver- 
sion to catastrophe would correspond to a concave downward, or uncer- 
tainty averse, utility. He then defines a desire for equity as a desire to 
make any two individual probabilities of dying less different. Finally, he 
shows that such a desire for equity corresponds to a convex downward 
utihty function, and so is incompatible, in his model, with aversion to 
catastrophe. The significance of t h s  conclusion becomes more clear 
when one realizes that any change to increase equity ( h s  definition) also 
increases the variance in number of fatalities. That is, Keeney has basi- 
cally made the statement that "equity is uncertainty". It is from that 
statement that his conclusion flows most directly. This matter is an 
excellent example of how surprising conclusions can be drawn from sim- 
ple evaluation models and simple definitions of measures of social con- 
cerns, such as equity and potential for catastrophe. 
c) Ease of iden t i f y ing  people a t  risk: ease  of def ining the i m p a c t e d  
9TOUP. 
As with the previous concept, the key to this concept of equity is 
knowledge, but in this case in a more subtle way. Suppose some advance 
in science enables the certain identification of a victim before he  is killed 
by a technology. Even though society now has perfect knowledge as to 
who the victim will be, there may not be a perception of inequity if the 
victim cannot be easily described. If there is nothing in common among 
the victims except that they are American, say, then the impact of the 
technology may be seen as equitable. If ,  however, all victims are black, or 
all asbestos workers, or all live downwind of a nuclear reactor, or  all are 
poor, the impacts would be seen as inequitable, regardless of how large or 
small the group sharing the risk is. 
The three general considerations described so far (expected number 
of effects, catastrophe, and equity) are three distinct measures of social 
risk. A three-dimensional table could be laid out, with each cell filled with 
an example representing a different combination of levels of the three 
measures of social risk. Each of those examples could be described by a 
probability distribution over various dimensions, such as numbers of 
health effects, classes of people, space, and time. The remaining con- 
siderations, discussed below, are not so amenable to quantification. 
4 .  Degree of control  
The concept of degree of control has two different aspects: an 
impacted individual's participation in the decision to expose hmself to 
the risk, and an individual's participation in the decision to deploy the 
technology. The former aspect coincides with the voluntary vs involun- 
tary risk distinction made by Starr  (1969) and discussed by others (Otway 
and Cohen 1975). Starr  presented evidence whch  he interpreted as  indi- 
cating that  society has a much higher threshold of acceptability for risks 
involving voluntary exposure than for risks incurred involuntarily. Argu- 
ments against that hypothesis have appeared in the literature, most 
recently in the paper by Slovic and Fischhoff (1981), which concludes that  
apparent aversion to involuntary risk can be better explained by the 
higher potential for catastrophe and inequity that often accompany that  
type of risk. However, another paper involving the same two authors 
stresses the importance of public participation in the second of the two 
decisions listed above, concerning the deployment of the technology 
(Fischhoff, e t  a1 1980). That second decision involves an  aspect that  is 
basically different from any consideration mentioned so far, in that it has 
little to do with the physical source or .irnpactee, but addresses the pro- 
cess whch  generated that  source and impactee. As some have pointed 
out (Green 1981) one determinant of that elusive concept called accept- 
able risk is the acceptability of the process that generated the risk. 
5. Attributability 
Attributability of cause is the first in a series of considerations that  
involve very large steps away from a model that  could be easily defended 
on prescriptive grounds, steps toward a descriptive model. In some ways, 
this consideration is related to equity: while some aspects of equity have 
to do with ease of identifying an impactee, attributability concerns the 
ease of identifying the source of the effect. Attributability is also highly 
correlated with catastrophe, as there is usually little doubt as to the  
immediate cause of a catastrophe, while it would be much harder to  iden- 
tify the cause of a more distributed set  of effects. If a se t  of effects is 
clearly attributable to  a single cause, that cause is more ap t  to be 
discovered and to  give rise to  societal corrective mechanisms than is a 
cause with more subtly distributed effects. A gas tank design feature 
that  makes a car  go up like a torch when hit is much more apt  to be 
reacted against than a steering design flaw that  leads to crashes errone- 
ously attributed to  driver error. 
The last example suggests that  attributability, l ~ k e  equity, is an  
aspect very dependent on level of information. As epidemiological studies 
and national medical reporting systems become more effective, diseases 
that  would have gone unnoticed and unfeared a few years ago become 
centers of attention and concern. Effects of pesticides, defoliants, and 
other widely dispersed chemicals cause concern only when they are 
recognized as cornlng from controllable chemicals, yet those effects may 
only be able to  be detected by very sophisticated techniques, if a t  all. 
Attributability has more than the two levels: recognized and unrecog- 
nized. It concerns how easily the cause can be identified. Of course, a 
society will only react to risks that are recognized, but beyond that ,  the 
ease with whch the cause can be described will affect the ease of ideation 
of the risk as a menace. To return to the car gas tank design example, 
the image of an  engineering staff making a fairly well-defined decision not 
to incorporate a safety feature is a very clear target for public reaction. 
It could be that  a general lack of competence of an automotive engineer- 
ing staff could contribute much more to driving risk than any single deci- 
sion about gas tanks, but general lack of competence is much harder to 
identify, and even if identified, forms a much more diffuse image for pub- 
lic reaction to try to  focus on. While these aspects are part of a descrip- 
tive basis for attributability as a dimension of risk, they also suggest a 
prescriptive basis, in that the ease of identification of a cause is apt  to 
reflect very closely the ease of management of the risk. 
6. Non-  probabi l i s t ic  f a c t o r s  
Perhaps the most important dimension of social risk from the 
psychological perspective is the size of the maximum potential catas- 
trophe, considered w i t h o u t  any weighting by its probability. The idea of 
evaluating an alternative by a possible outcome without considering its 
probability is a very large step away from a prescriptive evaluation model 
and toward a descriptive one. It can be extremely troublesome for the 
analyst, not only because it doesn't seem to make sense to someone used 
to  probabilistic models, but also because the description of a maximum 
potential catastrophe is dependent on the imagination of the analyst, and 
on a n  ill-defined notion 01 what "potential" is. Yet the political process 
typically does not share the probabilistic perspective that  is so funda- 
mental to risk assessment. One example involves the at tempt to site a 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal a t  Oxnard, California. Whle risk ana- 
lyses found the site to be safe, maximum credible accident (MCA) 
scenarios involving very large numbers of fatalities formed a large par t  of 
the  political debate whch  led to the effective rejection of the site. That 
debate &d not seem very sensitive to the  extremely low probabilities 
that  could be assigned to  the MCA's (.Ahern 1980). 
There are  a number of explanations that  could be invoked for this 
non-probabilistic evaluation. First, it could be that  members of the politi- 
cal process do not know how to think probabilistically, or do not have a 
feel for what a very low probability means. Second, members of the pol- 
itical process may simply doubt the low probabilities. That doubt may be 
well founded, as it is impossible in any actual case to guarantee the com- 
pleteness of any risk analysis, and major accidents can be identified that  
were pronounced impossible before their occurrence (e.g.,  the Titanic), 
or that were not effectively described by a preceding risk analysis. In a 
particularly strict sense, no absolute probabilities are ever calculated by 
a risk analysis. The probabilities reported by such analyses are condi- 
tional on the validity of the assumptions of the analysis, including those 
concerning its completeness and descriptive validity. It may be  very rea- 
sonable for members of the political process to doubt that  an extremely 
low probability is in fact that low, given its conditional nature. 
A t h r d  reason for non-probabilistic evaluation is a desire for resilient 
social support systems. Given the extreme uncertainty in what future 
demands will be made on, for example, an energy supply system, and the 
uncertainty in the behavior of that system, it may make sense to design it 
to be as resilient as possible. One way to  promote resilience is to limit 
the maximum potential catastrophe or MCA. 
A fourth reason for non-probabilistic evaluation is a sensitivity to the 
concept of dread as a social cost. If a large plant is erected that has an 
MCA involving the deaths of 40,000 people living downwind, those people 
are going to  live their lives with a sense of dread that is not very directly 
related to  the very low probability a risk analysis might assign to  the MCA. 
That sense of dread may be a very real decrement in their quality of life, 
regardless of how safe the plant is as measured by any risk analysis. 
It may be helpful to give some meaning to the idea of limiting the 
KCA of an  option with a brief example. The most dramatic MCA's involve 
accidents a t  large scale facilities that  send poisons or flammable gasses 
into the air that can cause large numbers of fatalities downwind. Exam- 
ples include nuclear reactors, LNG terminals, and chemical plants. In any 
of these cases, the MCA can be limited by requiring that the facility be 
sited remotely, but only a t  a financial and perhaps environmental cost. 
7. Non- dec i s ion  c o m p a r i s o n s  
All the  factors discussed above could a t  least be fit into a decision 
analytic framework, in that  each could be involved in a comparative 
evaluation of at  least two alternatives in a decision. However, there are  
comparisons made in some risk analyses that have nothing directly to do 
with the decision being considered (Cohen and Lee 1979). It makes 
immediate sense to compare the risks of a coal electricity-generating 
plant with a nuclear one, as those are two realistic alternatives con- 
sidered by a utility in expanding its capacity. I t  makes much less 
immediate sense to compare the risks of living near a nuclear reactor 
with the risk of moving to Denver, driving a car an  extra three miles, or 
smoking an  extra pack of cigarettes. The last three comparisons do not 
relate very directly to any decision, as few people actually do choose 
between a reactor neighborhood and Denver, or between living near a 
reactor and smoking more. 
The intent of the. non-decision comparisons listed above is to fit some 
technological risk into the same scale with risks people normally accept, 
then go on to draw conclusions regarding the acceptability of the techno- 
logical risk. There are  a number of problems with this approach as a way 
t o  establish the acceptability of a risk. However, non-decision comparis- 
ons are based on an idea that  could be incorporated in a risk evaluation 
model: people make choices every day that  involve risk, and those typical 
risks may form benchmarks on an individual's scale of perceived risk. 
There are  problems in that the various risks considered are evaluated dif- 
ferently (nuclear power, background radiation, driving, smoking), but 
once those differences are accounted for within an  evaluation function, 
routine decisions involving risk could be used as meaningful points of 
reference on the  scale of the risk evaluation index (see Lichtenstein e t  al.  
1978). 
8. Non-technological  f ac tor s  
While the set of factors described so far has spanned a wide range of 
characteristics, all of them have been concerned with the deleterious 
health and environmental effects of the evaluated technology. In this 
final step in the progression of factors, even that one common thread is 
abandoned as non-technological factors, factors other than health and 
environmental effects, are considered. A number of analysts have 
observed that  resistance to nuclear power may be based in part  on a 
resistance to the political side effects of the technology: the centraliza- 
tion of power that might accompany a centralized generation of electri- 
city; the loss of civil liberties that might result from efforts to prevent 
diversion of nuclear material, etc. There might also be resistance to per- 
ceived effects on lifestyle: the more materialistic, growth-based, exploita- 
tive society made possible by nuclear power; the less natural, less simple. 
less human society associated with the high technology of nuclear power. 
While the attribution of such far-ranging effects to  nuclear power is cer- 
tainly arguable, the fact remains that there is a body of survey evidence 
establishrng that segments of the population do ascribe these effects to 
nuclear power (Otway and Pahner 1976). 
I t  is one thing to establish that non-technological effects are impor- 
tant  to some people's evaluation of a technological alternative. It is quite 
another problem to decide how that fact would be used in developing a 
risk evaluation model. The incorporation of non-technological effects 
would be required in a risk evaluation model intended to predict political 
resistance to the deployment of a technology. Yet that  incorporation 
would expand such a model beyond the role of evaluating risk. It seems 
tha t  the decision whether or not to attempt to include non-technological 
effects in the model is a decision on model scope. Is the model to be a 
risk evaluation model or is it to be a resistance prediction model? The 
discussions in t h s  paper are aimed a t  the development of a risk evalua- 
tion model sensitive to  societal concerns. That model does not have to be 
a resistance prediction model in order to aid the political decision mak- 
ing process in evaluating social risk. It follows, then, that  while non- 
technological factors are a useful end-point in a progression of social con- 
cerns, they are not necessarily to be included in a risk evaluation model. 
Perhaps the most useful role such factors play in the discussions of this 
paper is in defimng the limits to whch  a risk evaluation model should go 
in the progression from technical risk evaluation to  aiding the political 
decision making process. 
D. Incorporating Risk Evaluation Factors into a Risk Evaluation Func- 
tion 
The previous section listed eight factors involved in the evaluation of 
social risk from a psychological perspective. While it has been argued 
that  the eighth factor is not appropriate for inclusion in a risk evaluation 
model, the other seven are. The development of a risk evaluation model 
is then defined as  the development of measures of each of the seven fac- 
tors, then the combination of those measures into a single index. WtLlle 
these two tasks are the subject of future research, t h s  section briefly 
comments on some aspects of the  two tasks apparent from an examina- 
tion of current risk evaluation work. 
The first thing to note about the problem of incorporating the dif- 
ferent factors into a single evaluation model is that each of the existing 
measures incorporates only a few of the various factors. Rasmussen 
curves, for example, measure the potential for catastrophe, could be 
used to define a maximum credible accident as  a non-probabilistic meas- 
ure, and have been used for non-decision comparisons of social risk (e.g.,  
reactor risk vs. meteorite risk). However, such curves do not reflect any 
of the other factors. Descriptions of risk involving the set of individual 
probabilities of health effects, [pi{, lend themselves to reflecting con- 
cerns about equity, and are appropriate for non-decision comparisons a t  
an  individual level, but do not reflect the other factors. Of course, 
Rasmussen curves could be calculated for each of several subgroups of 
the  population to address concerns about equity, and the work of Keeney 
(1980b) and Bodlly (1980) extends evaluations of [pi] to include concerns 
about catastrophe, but the  fact remains that  no existing evaluation meas- 
ure or model addresses all seven of the factors described. 
Sometimes the assumptions ~nvolved in a risk evaluation model can 
restrict in a very subtle way whch  factors are  addressed. For example, 
Keeney (1980b) sets up a notation and a basic model in such a way that  
assumptions about treating everyone equally and correspondence 
between e z  ante  and ezpost  utilities lead to a single-attribute utility func- 
tion on number of fatalities as a risk evaluation measure. While his nota- 
tion, basic model, and assumptions are intuitively compelling, the result- 
ing measure is sensitive only to  expected numbers of fatalities, to bunch- 
ing by state of nature and to equity in an  equally-shared pi sense. The 
other factors are missed not because of obvious features of the model, 
but because of a lack of dimensionality in the original situation to be 
evaluated. 
The example of Keeney's model is given because it illustrates the  
importance of the first s tep in developing a comprehensive risk evalua- 
tion model: the description of the effect space to be evaluated. Keeney's 
description of the effect space as  a probability distribution over lpif 
accounts in large part  for the nature of h s  resulting risk evaluation 
measure. The same information cast into a catastrophe-by-equity-by- 
expected fatality space could lead to a very different risk evaluation 
measure, but one still limited in the factors it could address. In order to 
address all factors, an evaluation model must begin with an  effect space 
in whch  all factors are represented. Because the  seven factors involve 
such different aspects as bunchng of effects and the participatory nature 
of the process, there are several different ways to set  up the effect space. 
Clearly, the first step in future research on the development of risk 
evaluation models is an  examination of those different effect spaces to  
select the one most appropriate for a meaningful value representation 
and elicitation procedure. 
v. SUMMARY 
T h s  paper has discussed the problem of developing better risk 
evaluation models. After an  examination of the  central problem of risk 
evaluation, defining what risk is, two risk evaluation approaches were 
presented that  bracket a particular part  of the analysis spectrum in need 
of development. That approach involves the expansion of multiattribute 
utility risk evaluation functions to be more sensitive to social and political 
concerns regarding risk management. Initial considerations for research 
in that direction were laid down. That approach appears to be feasible, 
and promises a more useful role for analyses in the process of social risk 
management. 
The most unusual feature of the broad approach proposed in this 
paper is that it seeks t o  explicitly recognize some of the political realities 
involved in the social risk management process. An attempt is proposed 
to develop an evaluation model that deviates from prescriptive considera- 
tions to account for preferences expressed in the political decision mak- 
ing process. This attempt is marked by several difficulties, perhaps the 
most notable among them being the ethically troublesome result men- 
tioned earlier: evaluation models sensitive to any feature in addition to 
or other than expected fatalities will generally advise the selection of pol- 
icies which do not maximize expected number of lives saved. Policy mak- 
ers usyo  such models could be accused of "sacrificing lives, expectation- 
ally" for the sake of being responsive to other societal concerns. Of 
course, expected lives are  allowed to be lost to gain on other dimensions 
all the time in public policy decisions, but it may be difficult to do so deli- 
berately, as an explicit step in the policy making process. Whle this 
example is given as the most troublesome one, it is clearly only one of 
many difficulties to be encountered in explicitly incorporating sensitivity 
to  societal concerns in the political decision making process. 
The main potential benefit of the proposed broad evaluation model is 
that  it seeks to avoid the problem of a technically correct risk analysis 
advising the promotion of a project that  is eventually rejected due to 
popular opposition. Another benefit is its general decision aid orienta- 
tion, an improvement over standard risk analyses whch  are intended only 
as inputs into the decision making process. 
There are  two major limitations to  the broad approach proposed. 
First, the more explicit use of subjective judgments involved in the value 
elicitations can cause problems with the defensibility of the approach. 
Thls is in turn  a problem with the political decision making process, since 
those subjective judgments generally must be made somewhere in the 
decision making. They are either hldden in the assumptions of the model, 
or they are  explicit. But the fact remains that a government agency may 
have more trouble defending a decision based on an analysis with expli- 
citly subjective judgments than one based on an apparently objective 
analysis. 
The second problem is more basic, but less specific to the broader 
approach proposed. That problem is that  better evaluation models may 
not help social risk management as much as would better consideration 
of actual decision alternatives. As was mentioned in an  earlier section. 
risk analyses are  typically not part  of a political decision making process 
that recognizes the choice faced between several risky alternatives. As 
mentioned before, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission seems to  be faced 
continually with decisions that have the appearance of being "yes/no" 
decisions on a risky option, when i t  is actually participating in an unor- 
ganized way with several other government agencies and private com- 
panies in a process that makes "which decisions, choosing one of several 
risky alternatives. A political process that  explicitly faced such " w h l c h  
decisions would be able to make better use of comparative risk analyses 
(Ahern 1980). But perhaps t h s  identifies another potential advantage of 
the proposed approach. A risk evaluation model tha t  is oriented toward 
dimensions of concern to the political process could be designed in such a 
way that  comparison with the actual alternative is an  intrinsic pa r t  of the 
evaluation. 
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